Florida DUI Boater Guilty Of Killing Three

An Okaloosa County, Florida jury found Augusta Frederick Kennedy guilty last Thursday of 3 counts of BUI (Boating Under the Influence) manslaughter. No sentencing date has been set, because he still faces 5 misdemeanor charges related to the crash. Authorities say Kennedy's blood-alcohol level was more than twice the legal limit on September 4, 2009 when he crashed his boat into another vessel carrying 4 people, 3 of whom were killed. The three people killed were the month, father, and aunt of the skipper of a 20' center console.



The USCG "Tiger Team" investigator, Augusto (Kiko) Villalon, made a full report of the accident for the Coast Guard's Office of Boating Safety. This report was also given the jury which spent less than two hours coming to a guilty verdict on three counts of manslaughter. BoatTEST.com has obtained a copy of Mr. Villalon's report report.



We are publishing the report in its entirety to give readers a clear idea of the responsibilities of boaters when encountering another vessel. Not only are the facts of this tragic accident sobering, but so are the Rules of the Road requirements for every boater. They are rules not to be taken lightly at any time.

A Destin, Florida man faces up to 45 years in prison after a drunken boat crash that left 3 people dead. Police and prosecutors all over the U.S. are getting tough on drunk boaters.

Killed were George Brenner, 79; his wife Donna Brenner, 78; and Jeane Srowson, who was in her 60s, said Lt. Mark Hollinhead with the Florida Fish and Wildlife Conservation Commission. They were passengers on a 21-foot Sea Hunt center console driven by 54-year William “Bill” Brenner. George and Donna Brenner were his parents and Srowson was his aunt, Hollinhead said

Their boat collided with an 18-foot Bayliner just east of Marler Park about 7:30 p.m.

TIGER TEAM REPORT

TW0-BOAT COLLISION

FT. WALTON BEACH, FLORIDA

SEPTEMBER 4, 2009

DATE: November 5, 2009

TO: Phil Cappel, USCG Office of Boating Safety

CC: Inv. Eddie Gatlin, Florida FWC

Inv. Buddy Gomez, Office of State Atty., Florida

Lt. Ed Cates, Florida FWC

Col. Richard Moore, Florida FWC

Capt. Alan Richard, Florida FWC

FROM: Augusto (Kiko) Villalon, President Ancon Marine Consultants, Inc.

REFERENCE: A two-boat collision with three fatalities in Ft. Walton Beach, Florida, on Labor Day weekend, Sept. 4, 2009

Dear Mr. Cappel:

On October 1, 2009, following your instruction, I traveled to Pensacola, Florida to meet with Florida Fish & Wildlife Conservation Commission officers to aid in the investigation of a two-boat collision that occurred on Labor Day weekend on the ICW in Choctawhatchee Bay. Following is the result of my investigation of the incident.

VESSELS’ DESCRIPTIONS:

Vessel A: A 1998 Bayliner Capri, 19 ft.

HIN: BIYA880SF798

Stae Reg.: FL 8105 JN

Power: Mercruiser V-8 with Alpha One stern drive.

Vessel B: A 20 ft., 2006 Sea Hunt Center Console fishing boat

HIN: SXSW10416C606

Stae Reg.: AL 1953 LK

Power: Yamaha 150 HP Outboard engine

NARRATIVE: See sketch No. 1, 2 & 3.

On Sept. 4, 2009, the Bayliner Capri (Vessel A) with four people aboard left a pizza restaurant just west of the Brooks Bridge, heading east on the ICW to enter Choctawhatchee Bay and go home. The operator (Bayliner passenger No.1) made a wide turn and straightened his course to enter the channel into the bay. Somewhere between markers RN-14 and RN-8, the passenger on the port seat (Bayliner Passenger No.2) yelled at him to “turn”, and he made a hard turn to port (left).

At the same time there was a 20-ft. 2006 Sea Hunt center-console fishing boat (Vessel B) operating in the same sector of the ICW and going west with four people aboard. The operator (Sea Hunt Passenger No.1) stated that when he first saw the oncoming boat, he discerned it at about 10º on his port bow. He immediately made a turn to starboard (right) and this put him on a collision course with the Bayliner, which made an incorrect turn to the left. In his second interview with the investigating officer he assessed his turn to the right as a “half turn” of the steering wheel.

The operator of the Bayliner, in his statement, did not estimate his speed but told the investigating officer he though he would have been going 25-30 mph. However, at the time of rescue the throttle lever was found in the WOT (wide open throttle) position. A passenger on this boat also stated verbally in a second interview that Bayliner’s operator (Passenger No.1) was going at full speed all day long, and that he and the other passengers had discussed taking a cab home.

A side-glance type collision followed, with both vessels hitting each other on their starboard sides. The Bayliner vessel was badly damaged, including the following: the deck-to-hull joint became separated from bow to stern on the starboard side and all the way across the stern to the port stern corner; the windshield was demolished; the starboard deck coaming forward of the steering console was broken vertically; and the hull side was also damaged. None of the Bayliner’s passengers required hospitalization, even though they did complain of some minor neck soreness and other pains. See Sketch No.1 for location of seating arrangement and occupancy.

The Sea Hunt vessel, struck on the starboard bow, was primarily damaged on the bottom between the chine and the keel. It had a bad vertical fracture that must have also fractured the stringer system. I was unable to examine the stringer system because I could not get underneath the floor to see it.

The Sea Hunt’s passengers were seated as shown in Sketch No. 1. Occupancy was as follows:

Positon No. 1 Operator

No. 2 Operator’s aunt

No. 3 Operator’s father

No. 4 Operator’s mother

CAPTION

Passenger No. 3 (the father) was ejected, hitting the vessel’s coaming before going in the water, and was missing for a short period of time. A mullet fisherman who witnessed the incident immediately came to help. He found the father floating dead, and pulled him aboard the Sea Hunt vessel.

Passenger No. 4 (the mother) was thrown most likely against the starboard coaming. She had severe head injuries and died on the spot.

Passenger No. 2 (the aunt) was thrown to port, probably above the console because her impact blew the windshield apart and also broke the windshield rail. Her head and face injuries caused her to die on the spot.

The only non-passenger witness was the above-mentioned mullet fisherman aboard his own vessel. He was heading west close to the Sea Hunt, at about the same speed, which he estimated at between 20 and 22 mph. He saw the oncoming boat and witnessed the collision, immediately stopping to help the survivors. Every person making a statement agreed that both vessels had their navigation lights ON.

Alcohol tests were performed on the operators of both vessels. Test results revealed:

Operator Bayliner (Vessel A): 0.19%

Operator Sea Hunt (Vessel B): 0.07%

The Florida alcohol limit is 0.08%.

INVESTIGATION: See GPS location, chart 11385 below.

Both vessels were at the FWC office in Pensacola. At the time of my inspection, they had been kept just as they were when pulled out of the water. Damage to both boats was inspected and photographed. The descriptions are in the Narrative above. I checked the steering of the Sea Hunt and found it to be a Sea Star hydraulic system by Teleflex. The system turns 5.25 turns from end to end. From my experience, this half-turn would have provided ample action to avoid a collision with a head-on boat.

Inspection of the Bayliner revealed several coolers aboard with food in one cooler, beverages and water in one cooler, and beer and an empty bottle of Vodka in the third cooler. I believe it is virtually a miracle that no one was injured on this vessel, since the damage is extensive.

I read and have copies of all the statements collected by officer Gatlin (transcript attached). I discussed with him all the details referred to herein. He told me that the Sea Hunt had a GPS that was sent to the FDLE (Fla. Dept. of Law Enforcement) in Tallahassee to extract the record of the boat’s “track” in order to determine the exact location of the collision. We reviewed NOAA Chart No. 11385 (copy of the relevant section attached) and satellite views of the area. Results from the FDLE have been received. I have plotted the course of the Sea Hunt (Vessel B) in the last minute before the collision and have calculated its speed at 22 kt. (25.4 mph). I also asked Investigator Eddie Gatlin for a depth-of-channel survey for the collision’s location area (see sketch No. 3). This survey shows plenty of room with sufficient water depth for Vessel A (the Bayliner) to make a correct right turn once he had sighted Vessel B. Instead, he turned to the left, precipitating the collision.

CONCLUSIONS:

The tragic collision of these two boats, which occurred on September 4, 2009 during the Labor Day Weekend, was, in my opinion, caused by the operator of Vessel A, the Bayliner Capri, when he turned left into the path of the oncoming Vessel B. Vessel A’s operator, who was legally BUI and probably impaired by his 0.19% blood alcohol content, violated Florida State Statute 327.35—Boating under the influence. He also violated the Rules of the Road, Rule # 14, Head-On Situation, which reads: a) When two power-driven vessels are meeting on reciprocal or near reciprocal courses so as to involve risk of collision, each shall alter their course to starboard so that each shall pass on the port side of the other.
c) When a vessel is in doubt as to whether such a situation exists, he shall assume that it does exist and act accordingly.

Other contributory factors added to the cause of the collision, including:

• Violation of Rule # 5, Lookout, by the operator of Vessel A, the Bayliner. Passenger No. 2 of Vessel A did alert the operator about the oncoming vessel approaching their bow, but the Bayliner’s operator did not “make a full appraisal of the situation and the risk of collision” in proper time.
• Violation of Rule # 6, Proper Speed, by the operator of Vessel A. Compliance with this rule would have prevented the incident by his adjusting his speed to one that would have allowed him time to stop his vessel, or maneuver out of the risk of collision in time.
• Violation of Rule # 2, Responsibility. The operator of Vessel A was responsible for the safe conduct of his vessel and the safety of his passengers. He cannot be exonerated from the consequences of his actions.
• Violation of Rule # 8, Action to Avoid Collision, which reads: d) Action taken to avoid collision with another vessel shall be such as to result in passing at a safe distance.
• Violation of Rule # 34, Proper Signaling of Action Taken. The operator of Vessel A made no audible sound or radio signal of the action taken. If the operator of Vessel A intended to turn to port, in direct contravention of Rule # 14, Head-On Situation, he should have sounded TWO short blasts of a horn to signal that he intended to leave the other vessel by his starboard side.

The operator of Vessel B, the Sea Hunt, also had some minor responsibilities that were violated, such as:

Rule # 6, Proper Speed. In noticing that Vessel A, the Bayliner, was turning to port in contravention of Rule # 14, the operator of the Sea Hunt should have stopped his vessel in time to avoid the collision.

Rule # 8, Action to Avoid Collision. Neither vessel took action to avoid collision in time to stop or to make an ample turn that would have avoided the collision and prevented the accident.
Therefore, the operator of Vessel B, the Sea Hunt, must accept the consequences (to some extent) of his inability to stop in time.

In summary, it is my opinion that the operator of vessel A (the Bayliner Capri) was 95% responsible for the resulting collision and the operator of the vessel B (The Sea Hunt) was 5% responsible for the collision.

NOTE: The reason for which I give the operator of vessel B (The Sea Hunt) a 5% responsibility in this case is due to the “interpretation” of Rule No. 2-Responsibility. I quote from a copy of “Pocket Rules of the Road” published by Professional Mariner… “In summary, Rule 2 removes any argument that a participant in a collision is without fault.” (italics mine).

Signed on Pine Island, Florida, November 5, 2009

Augusto (Kiko) Villalon

Sketches and pictures mentioned above, which are attached and made part of this report:

Sketch No. 1: The location of passengers on each vessel

Sketch No. 2: The action of the operator of each vessel upon sight of one other

Sketch No. 3: The survey of the water’s depth in the location of the collision

Picture of GPS tracking

GPS tracking sketch of the last few seconds before the collision.

The course of vessel B, the Sea Hunt center console, is marked by the white line, starting at Pos 1949-30 that is at 7:49-30sec. PM
The collision location is marked as Pos. 1950-01 which is
7:50-01 sec for a time-lapse of 21 seconds. This track measures .22 mile.
The speed of the boat was then calculated as 25.4 mph.

We calculated that the collision occurred at this location:

Latitude 30-degrees 24’ 5.1” N

Longitude 86-degrees 34’ 45.5” W